India is a key player in the climate negotiations to reach a deal at Copenhagen. In recent months, it has clearly demonstrated the willingness to arrive at a ‘good’ deal rather than the ‘best’ one, as pointed out by Dr Jairam Ramesh, Indian Minister of State for Environment and Forests. The domestic social realities and consequent political obstacles underlying India’s tough negotiating stance need to be further recognised.

It is fairly well recognised within India that the country is acutely vulnerable to climate change. Impacts on water will be critical, with a less predictable and weaker monsoon impacting 65% of the population that depends on agriculture. With fewer but more intense periods of rainfall, there will be increased flooding. Also, the Himalayan glacier melt will put at risk irrigated agriculture and river-fed urban water supplies. Food production will fall and health impacts are likely to be severe. Lives and livelihoods of approximately 2.7 million families will be threatened by sea level rise, storms, and cyclones. On the adaptation side, it is claimed that India already spends ‘over 2% of its GDP on adaptation and this figure is likely to go up significantly’. Therefore, ‘the Copenhagen package must include global action on Adaptation in addition to action to GHG (greenhouse gas) abatement and reduction.’ India and China have, thus, argued that adaptation funding has to be available before developing countries agree to other actions. On the GHG mitigation front, India advances an argument for equity. Equity is not just a negotiating stance for India but a strongly felt moral imperative. With almost 456 million people below the international poverty line4 (roughly 19% more than in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa), four infant deaths a minute, and a maternal death every four minutes, and five deaths due to poverty is chronic. Four hundred million people have no electricity and for many others it is not available when required the most. Consequently, the key Indian voices resist any suggestion of action on climate change which could hamper the fight against poverty and energy insecurity—at least without compensating finance and suitable technologies from the West.

Within this frame of realities lies the Government of India’s official stance. India’s official position is based on the principle that long-term convergence of per capita emissions is ‘the only equitable basis for a global compact on climate change.’ It is based on the belief that no negotiations are possible without addressing the egregious equity issues due to the historical burden placed on poor countries by industrialised countries—contributors of roughly 72% percent of current GHG concentrations of 380 parts per million. Additionally, these industrialised countries continue to emit at per capita rates that are multiples higher than those of poor countries like India. Even so, some developed countries are calling on India to shoulder binding quantitative emissions targets, demands that New Delhi clearly resists. Yet Indian representatives are adamant that the official position is not a negative attitude. Rather, it is the north which has yet to demonstrate that it is serious about climate change by making tangible cuts in its emissions—only then may India consider joining a treaty at Copenhagen.

India’s Unilateral Actions

Patchy delivery on the Kyoto Protocol commitments by the Annex I countries further fuels India’s unwillingness to accede to any demands for emission reductions by the developing countries. Political leaders and bureaucrats within the country, however, have increasingly shown that the issue of climate change is being considered with a comprehensive view of the gains and trade-offs involved in various strategies and actions. In line with this, the country has on its own started taking unilateral mitigation cuts over the next fifteen to twenty years as a part of its development process—without, it must be said, jeopardising economic growth. Some of the domestic measures that have been announced include:

• The National Solar Mission, which sets targets of 20,000 megawatts (MW) of solar capacity by 2020, 100,000 MW by 2030, and 200,000 MW by 2050—to be achieved through regulatory/policy measures such as feed-in-tariffs, renewable purchase obligations, capital subsidies, and tax holidays

• A new Renewable Energy Law is being planned that will stipulate mandatory procurement of prescribed minimum renewable energy in each state. The move is aimed at diversifying the country’s energy mix that is dominated by oil, gas, and coal as basic fuel feed

• Forestry, where India’s recent announcements (to increase from the current 23% cover to 33%) put them on a track to sequester 15-20% of India’s total emissions by 2020

• The National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency, which by 2015 will help save about five% of the annual energy consumption and nearly 100 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent every year. This is to be achieved through a cap-and-trade mechanism in energy efficiency, announced as a ‘Perform, Achieve and Trade’ scheme

These measures are highly ambitious and fairly strategic in nature, as India in any case has to take them for its rapid development. As Shyam Saran, India’s Special Envoy of the Prime Minister on Climate Change, has indicated: ‘The kind of things that you need to do in terms of energy security is precisely the things that you need to do to deal with climate change.’ The country is, therefore, clear that initially, these will be the areas where India will unilaterally move ahead and that the developed countries need to provide adequate technology and finance support to make it happen.

These measures have also indicated to the international community that India wants to be a part of the international solution to climate change. India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, characterises the country’s energy efficiency efforts as sending ‘a powerful signal to the international community that we are willing to contribute in a significant manner to meeting the global challenge of climate change.’

Having undertaken certain proactive policies in the last year and having made considerable efforts to communicate them, India has managed to erase somewhat the impression that it represents an ‘obstruction to a climate deal’ as it had been painted by many countries. Often, however, the seemingly pragmatic focus of the Annex I states on the reality that all countries need to act fast misses the Indian moral arguments, leading to frustration on both sides. It is, therefore, now the turn of the Annex I countries to recognise their historical responsibility and make a radically enhanced offer of mitigation effort and finance.

The Way Forward

As many analysts have pointed out, India has historically been more comfortable with negotiations when it is defending its moral entitlements (e.g., in the WTO on issues of stonewalling by developed countries against granting full market access to the exports of poor countries and instead demanding serious concessions from developing countries.) And in these negotiations, India has often stood its ground well. But one of the consequences of India’s traditional negotiating position is that it has seldom been strong at bargaining. A moral entitlement approach to negotiation and a bargaining approach to negotiation require two very different sensibilities. The former requires sticking to a principle, even if the outcome is deadlock or isolation. The latter requires cutting deals, even if they are not based on the most equitable moral principle.

While India’s position so far has been largely articulated in the language of entitlements, recent statements by Indian leaders in international meetings have indicated a shift towards the bargaining style. This is understandable, since many of the major countries in the G77 block such as Brazil, Argentina and China have shown signs of being willing to give and take as well on crucial issues like emission reductions, Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV), and Reduced Emissions on Degradation and Deforestation (REDD). Agreements between India and China to coordinate and calibrate their positions before every major international gathering on climate change – and not to accept legally-binding targets on emissions reductions that may impact their development priorities – show that India does not plan to let itself be sidelined during the central deal. But India’s negotiators will keep open the option of a veto at Copenhagen if confronted with what they regard as an unreasonable outcome. It would not be difficult to sell this decision domestically by highlighting how little India has contributed to the problem and how pressing its development needs are.

Therefore, using a combination of moral entitlements and bargaining positions, India needs to convince the Annex I countries on certain issues, although dealing with different Annex I countries differently. India should:

• Build a case for supporting low carbon development: While the focus on development needs to be continued, India ought to come up with workable proposals on mechanisms for support by Annex I countries on increasing the focus on what sustainable, low carbon development looks like in practice and enhancing adaptation capabilities. A joint effort with the other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries will be a very significant step in this regard

• Build estimates of the Adaptation Financing required: While many estimates are already available for the volume of adaptation financing needs, none of them are country specific. India needs to develop its own estimates for adaptation funding requirements so as to build up a convincing case for its demand for an adaptation funding and technology package. Deeper insights into utilisation of this financing for various activities globally (e.g., Insurance, Conditional Cash Transfers, integration into government programmes, early warning systems, etc.) are likely to be very useful in extracting commitments from developed countries

• Build a national debate on climate change commitments: Given the wide ramifications of climate change issues and the domestic impacts of any treaty agreed upon in Copenhagen, debates need to expand beyond Delhi. A more participatory debate involving political representatives, civil society actors, and the bureaucracy (both at the national and sub-national level) is needed to build a national consensus. A better knowledge base and a more inclusive debate will allow India to take a more informed view of climate change both domestically and internationally and build broader support for implementing what are bound to be difficult options. It also presents an opportunity for India to rethink its development strategy and to formulate one that is more inclusive and less resource-intensive. q

Reference:
Stimson publication, Indian Climate Policy: Choices and Challenges, Stimson Center’s Communications department

George C. Varughese
gcvarughese@devalt.org
Udit Mathur
 

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