The renewal of the North-South dialogue was one of the major themes in several speeches made by Dr. Mostafa Tolba, former Executive Director of UNEP, during his recent visit to India. According to him, the concern generated by global environmental issues like ozone depletion and global warming in recent years has provided the basis for the renewal of the North-South dialogue.

Twenty years in UNEP have given Dr. Tolba keen insights into international environmental diplomacy. If the observes the re-emergence of the North-South dialogue what explains the silence among political leaders in the South? Certainly, today we see little of the activity to reinforce Southern unity that marked the 1970s, when the North-South dialogue was at its peak. The general air of expectancy and enthusiasm in the South which marked the passage in the UN General Assembly of the Resolution on the New International Economic Order in 1974 is now absent. Obviously, there must be differences between the North-South dialogue of the 1990s which Dr. Tolba welcomes, and that of the 1970s. What are these differences?

In the 1970s, the strategy of the South was clear, and its logic impressive. The success of OPEC in raising the price of oil during the first price hike in 1973-74 suggested to many developing countries that by forming cartels they could obtain a better price for their natural resource exports. Moreover, by threatening to with-hold key resources from export to the North, they could extract concessions and obtain a better deal for the South in international economic relations - better terms of trade for the primarily commodity-exporting developing countries, greater access to international liquidity, more equal participation in the management of international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, greater control over the activities of trans-national corporations and so on. Such a bargaining strategy was indeed formulated at the 1973 meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries in Algeria. Southern unity was welded around the programme for a New International Economic Order. This unity, backed by the evident bargaining power of OPEC and the nascent bargaining power of other resource-rich developing countries, brought the North to the bargaining table.

Therefore, the North-South dialogue in the 1970s was characterised by the South’s recognition of its bargaining power, its employment of this power in a bargaining strategy to extract concessions from the North, and the maintenance of Southern unity through testing times.

All the above features are missing today. The South does not recognise its bargaining strengths. Statements about the South’s importance as a major source of greenhouse gas emissions whose interests have to be taken into account in any future climate change protocol, or the South’s importance as a source of genetic resources for the North’s biotechnology industry, tend to be made in apologetic tones, rather than as assertions of Southern bargaining strategy has been formulated by Southern states to capitalise on these strengths. In the absence of strategy and goals, there is obviously neither any question of conviction in the South about the correctness of its position nor any anticipation of success in negotiations with the North. Under the circumstances, unity fades and what we see instead is the disintegration of the South-as evidenced, for instance, in the diametrically opposite position taken by the Small Island States coalition and OPEC over the climate change issue.

Should the South be written-off as a bloc then? No, because there is still some basis for Southern unity in negotiations over global environmental issues. Traditional factors still unite countries of the South. These include a shared history of exploitation (particularly for the excolonial states of Asia and Africa), a shared resentment of Northern control over the international levers of power, a shared desire to enhance their wealth and power vis-a-vis the North, and a shared willingness to use their strength in numbers, particularly in fora where the one state - one vote principle is accepted, like the UN-General Assembly, to pressure the North to restructure the international order. In addition each of climate change, biodiversity loss, and tropical deforestation (the 3 issues for which treaties were sought to be negotiated during UNCED) displays signs of broad North-South differentiation.

On the issue of climate change, North-South differentiation is evident in the manner in which the South argues that the North is primarily responsible for greenhouse gas-induced climate change through its profligate greenhouse gases (GHG) consumption historically and to date. The South refuses to restrict its GHG consumption in order to accommodate the North’s need to maintain its standard of living and rates of economic growth. If restrictions become imperative, the South would expect to be compensated by the North. On the issue of biodiversity loss, North-South differentiation is inherent in the genetic richness of the South as compared to the North, and evident in the South’s demands that it be compensated for the preservation and protection of biodiversity, particularly by trans-national corporations often in the biotech-industry, which benefit from the utilisation of the South’s genetic resources. The issue of tropical deforestation is also a North-South issue, because the vast majority of the tropical forests exist only in the South. Naturally, many developing countries see the international interest in tropical forests as an intrusion into the sovereignty of tropical forest owning states.

Although a basis for Southern unity does exist, the fact is that the South has not pulled together and attempted to negotiate as a bloc with the North. Does this mean that the South has given up those views that it held with such conviction in the 1970s, particularly with regard to restructuring the international economies order? Not, if the rhetoric of the South at meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, Commonwealth Heads of Government, smaller groups of developing countries (New Delhi - 1990, Beijing - 1991, Kuala Lumpur - 1992), and in the UN General Assembly is anything to go by. However, the economic vulnerability of the South and the disinclination of the North to yield concessions have combined to throttle meaningful North-South dialogue. The ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s left the economies of many developing countries in a highly weakened state - high inflation, crushing debts, high unemployment and austerity programmes were the lot of country after country. Today, several dozen developing countries are undergoing structural adjustment programmes sponsored by the IMF and World Bank. Economic vulnerability obviously diminishes the desire to antagonise the North, upon whose aid so many developing countries are presently dependent. Moreover, coinciding with the South’s economic weakness, the North also is facing a situation of economic difficulty, whether it be the US’ massive budget deficit and perceived loss of competitive edge to countries like Japan, or the recession in the UK, or the costs of reunification in Germany, which makes it very reluctant to make any concessions to the South. Complicating the situation, the disintegration of the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union has transformed the ex-socialist states, vocal supporters of the South’s cause in the past, into competitors with the South and supplicants for Northern financial and technological assistance.

The South must accept that the North-South dialogue at the present juncture will have to be sectoral. It is futile to think in terms of lining action on climae change and biodiversity loss to stabilisation of commodity prices and greater democracy in the management of the IMF and World Bank. Within each sector, however, the South must hammer away at the characteristics which separate North and South.

What should the South’s strategy be under the circumstances? The South certainly cannot expect the sort of comprehensive, cross-sectoral dialogue envisaged in the 1970s. There simply does not exist the political will for this today. The South must accept that the North-South dialogue at the present juncture will have to be sectoral. It is futile to think in terms of linking action on climate change and biodiversity loss to stabilisation of commodity prices and greater democracy in the management of the IMF and World Bank. Within each sector, however, the South must hammer away at the characteristics which separate North and South. This will foster Southern unity. The differences between North and South must be made clear particularly in the North, where ignorance or misunderstanding of the South’s position abounds. Having established that its priorities need not be the same as the North’s, and that its perception of global environmental problems differs from the North’s, the South must capture the Northern public’s imagination by offering its full partnership in resolving the problems. However, it must not do this as a matter of course, or as part of some conception of its ‘planetary’ responsibilities. Altruism will not change the injustice of the international economic order. Indeed, by failing to clarify the individual responsibility of each state, Southern states would be letting down their people who quite possibly will be the worst sufferers from global environmental change. The South must offer its co-operation only after receiving acknowledgement from the North of the differences between North and South.

The preceding argument can be built upon by suggestions such as those made by Dr. Tolba:

the basis of the South’s partnership with the North should be the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. This device, used in Rio, establishes the common stake of the North and South in protecting and preserving the global environment. At the same time it recognises their different contributions to the problem and different abilities to contribute to a solution. It is a just principle in-as-much as developing states will find their responsibilities increasing with time, relative to the North, as their contributions to global environmental problems also increase.

the South should demand the transfer of environmentally - friendly technology from the North within the context of their shared vision of achieving sustainable development. Such transfers should help the South leapfrog from its present stage of technological development to a more advanced, environmentally sustainable stage of development.

In due course, when the international economic and political situation becomes more favourable, the South can think about extending the scope of North-South dialogue. For the present, the above agenda should be pursued, and Southern policy makers should make clear their willingness to use whatever opportunity is provided them to pursue their goals. q

(Mukund G. Rajan is doing his Ph.D in International Relations at Oxford University)